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Effective Governance of Global Financial
Markets: an Evolutionary Plan for Reform
Emilios Avgouleas
School of Law, University of Edinburgh
Abstract
Two questions remain widely open when it comes to global ﬁnancial markets. First, what is the raison d’e^tre of open
global markets? Second, is it possible to foster open markets without an international governance structure supervising
them? Post-crisis regulatory reform presents an acute paradox. While the content of international ﬁnancial regulation is
changing rapidly, the reform of governance structures is painfully slow. There is no formal governance structure dealing
with cross-border supervision of global ﬁnancial institutions. In addition, there is no crystallized institutional capacity at
the international level dealing with cross-border crises and the resolution of global institutions. Other areas of concern
are the global supervision of systemic risk and the absence of a reliable ﬁnance research watchdog dealing with the
production of regulatory standards. This article outlines an international governance framework to deal effectively with
these concerns. The adoption of the proposed plan would lead to breaking down the territorial link in the supervision
of large ﬁnancial institutions and of systemic risk, without causing intolerable loss of sovereignty. In addition, the pro-
posed structure is premised on a set of explicit values. These would provide a strong signal to global markets that they
need to shift their focus from speculation to development goals.
Policy Implications
• Building a new governance framework for global ﬁnance
• Meeting the supervisory challenge of cross-border banking
• Addressing the risk of ﬁnancial innovation
• Global systemic risk monitoring
• Fostering global ﬁnancial stability
• Fostering sustainable economic development
It is generally accepted that free ﬂows of (mostly) private
funds, whether in the form of capital investment or credit
from one corner of the globe to the other, can prove to
be strong development and poverty eradication tools. In
addition, global ﬁnancial markets must operate to
enhance the management and diversiﬁcation of risk origi-
nating in these ﬂows of capital; fostering, rather than
undermining, ﬁnancial stability. Naturally, a derivatives
market that supports the information efﬁciency and
liquidity of international markets and allows market actors
to hedge attendant risks is a welcome development. In
fact, ﬁnancial innovation can become a strong agent of
economic growth if used properly (Buckley, 2009). But
what about the myriad of speculative ﬁnance techniques
and instruments developed over the last 30 years? Do
they also serve any welfare enhancement goals? And how
do we account for the fact that ﬁnancial markets might
be inherently unstable? The reasonable answer to these
questions is to make global markets and large ﬁnancial
institutions safer by improving their regulation. However,
would that be enough, or is there also a need for interna-
tional structures employed to build risk roadblocks and
initiate remedial action throughout the ﬁnance chain to
prevent interconnected global markets from exacerbating
a systemic crisis? Shouldn’t there be appropriate bodies
monitoring the way different risks correlate at the global
level and supervising ﬁnancial institutions’ market behav-
iour and compliance with prophylactic regulations?
In the aftermath of the global ﬁnancial crisis (GFC), a
number of signiﬁcant reforms have been adopted to
improve the regulatory framework. These include new
capital and liquidity requirements for banks, measures to
battle interconnectedness in the ﬁnancial sector, new res-
olution regimes that would allow banks to fail without
causing systemic disruption, and more strict frameworks
for bank supervision and the monitoring of systemic risk
(Avgouleas, 2012). Yet limited progress has been made
with respect to governance structures. Speciﬁcally, global
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ﬁnancial governance needs a radical enrichment of its
structures and objectives in four areas:
1. effective supervision and monitoring of systemic risk
in global markets, especially risk originating in the
shadow banking sector;1
2. effective supervision of big cross-border institutions,
so-called globally signiﬁcant ﬁnancial institutions
(G-SIFIs);
3. effective understanding and management of risk in
the ﬁnancial sector, especially risk attached to ﬁnan-
cial innovation, and the production of astute regula-
tory standards;
4. effective resolution of cross-border ﬁnancial institu-
tions (G-SIFIs) and, more importantly, of cross-border
ﬁnancial groups.
In this article I sketch a tighter, more hierarchical and
more encompassing model of governance for global
ﬁnancial markets that could further the effectiveness of
recent reforms protecting the ideal of open global mar-
kets and enhancing their legitimacy. To many this pro-
posal might have the sound of an unrealistic academic
exercise that inevitably requires reform, signiﬁcant loss of
sovereignty, and expenditure of the grandest scale. Yet it
is the duty of academic commentators to think of possi-
ble ways to overcome/bypass these obstacles in order to
mobilize constituents that could inﬂuence the currently
negative attitude of large economies to international
governance structures for global ﬁnance.
The proposed global governance structure would have
four pillars supported by a similar number of global
administrative agencies: a global macroprudential super-
visor; a global microprudential supervisor; a global ﬁnan-
cial policy, research and regulation authority; and a
global resolution authority (see section 2 and Figure 1).
The establishment of such a governance system presup-
poses the negotiation and signing of an (umbrella) inter-
national treaty governing the most important aspects of
international ﬁnance. Arguably, international endorse-
ment of this plan does not lead to intolerable institu-
tional disruption and expenditure, as it makes full use of
existing structures and contemporary regulatory develop-
ments. These properties give the proposed plan a distinc-
tively evolutionary proﬁle.
1. Soft law financial governance ‘is not
working’
Overview
Arguably, the global ﬁnancial governance system is pre-
mised on four central pillars that incorporate a diverse
‘legal’ and organizational universe of rules and actors.
The ﬁrst pillar comprises the international treaties on
which the most important international ﬁnancial institu-
tions (IFIs), such as the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the regional development banks and the World
Bank, have been founded. The second pillar encom-
passes state-to-state contact and coordination groups,
such as the groups of seven (G7) and twenty (G20) most
developed countries. The third pillar is based on ‘infor-
mal’, consensus-based (soft law) structures, normally
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Figure 1. The proposed global governance structure.
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called transnational regulatory networks (TRNs), which
comprise regulatory agencies and central banks rather
than governments and act as standard setters. The most
well-known international ﬁnance TRNs are the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the Interna-
tional Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)
and the Financial Stability Board (FSB). The fourth pillar is
public–private sector partnership, which mostly refers to
the inﬂuence of private-sector bodies and trade organisa-
tions with regard to the content and direction of interna-
tional ﬁnancial standards (IFSs) issued by the requisite
TRNs (Avgouleas, 2012).
IFSs are generally accepted principles, practices (acting
as ‘default rules’) and guidelines, ranging from account-
ing standards to disclosure rules for securities issuers and
capital adequacy requirements of banks. Most of the IFSs
are incorporated into TRN member and nonmember
jurisdictions through national implementation (Brummer,
2012; Weber, 2009; Giovanoli, 2009, p. 84). Both TRNs
and IFIs are involved in monitoring compliance with the
IFS, either through peer-review procedures or through
the IMF’s and the World Bank’s Financial Sector Assess-
ment Program (FSAP) and Reports on the Observance of
Standards and Codes (ROSCs). Finally, the enforcement of
cooperation is premised on bilateral and multilateral
(quasi-binding) memoranda of understanding.
Advantages of TRNs: flexibility and cooperation
TRNs and their soft law standards have been hailed as
important mechanisms to resolve the regulatory coordi-
nation and enforcement challenges posed by globaliza-
tion in a number of areas ranging from the governance
of biogenetic research to ﬁnancial regulation. TRN theory
has its origins in a ‘soft power’ view of international rela-
tions, which was pioneered by leading liberal political
theorists Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (Koehane and
Nye, 1975, 2001). Their analysis was reconceptualized
and applied in a number of areas, where international
cooperation is of the essence, by Anne Marie Slaughter
and other international relations scholars, who have pro-
posed a ‘soft form’ of international cooperation through
TRNs as an effective solution to global problems (Slaugh-
ter, 2004a, pp. 12–14; Raustiala, 2002).
TRNs and soft law present, according to their propo-
nents, two distinct advantages. They lower the cost of
contracting (Abott and Snidal, 2000) and entail reduced
loss of sovereignty, as they are less restrictive and easier
to defect than a (hard law) international treaty (Epstein
and O’Halloran, 2008; Lipson, 1991; Chinkin, 2008). TRNs
are also assumed to be a better mechanism to resolve,
inter alia, cross-border coordination and enforcement
conundrums, especially where issues of sovereignty and
national interest protection are of paramount concern.
Shortcomings in regulatory coordination
The view that TRNs are the solution to the regulatory
challenges facing ﬁnancial markets is not universally
accepted. Strong objections have been raised highlight-
ing the multitude of weaknesses associated with the
operation of TRNs as global ﬁnancial regulators. First, a
national regulator’s principal concern is not furthering
global policy objectives but the protection and
advancement of the interests of its national industry.
There is no evidence of the suggested (Slaughter,
2004b, pp. 159–163) dual duty of regulators within
TRNs to both domestic and global interests. But even
if we could ﬁnd evidence of such a duty, national reg-
ulators would still not be entirely impartial actors dedi-
cated to the protection of global public goods such as
ﬁnancial stability. Yet every rule or standard proposed
by TRNs in the realm of international ﬁnance is bound
to have distributional consequences that might affect
domestic interests and, above all, domestic ﬁnancial
stability and ﬁscal outlay.
The fact that TRNs are institutionally ill-equipped to
resolve conﬂicts that entail distributional consequences
is a matter of great signiﬁcance because international
regulatory cooperation often involves signiﬁcant con-
ﬂicts over the distributive consequences of new stan-
dards. As developed countries dominate the TRNs, it is
not surprising (albeit inequitable) that such conﬂicts
are resolved in favour of the industries dominated by
TRN members – even where this is at the expense of
better regulatory outcomes. The most signiﬁcant distri-
bution concerns are raised by capital markets disclo-
sure, market integrity rules and cross-border crisis
management and bank resolution operations. The latter
became rather common during the GFC. Even
approaches to the regulation of systemic risk may dif-
fer according to national economic interest and the
desire to protect key economic sectors or the domestic
ﬁnancial services industry (Gadinis, 2008). In such cases,
in the absence of a predetermined legally binding
framework, regulators have very little incentive to
cooperate and adopt more stringent regulatory stan-
dards or, for instance, take prompt corrective action
(PCA).
Moreover, international standard setters do not always
provide clear or effective guidance for emerging chal-
lenges or risks. Their pre-2008 standards, especially the
Basel capital adequacy framework, proved inadequate in
many ways; this included a total failure to appreciate the
inadequacy of credit risk agency (CRA) models and their
glaringly apparent conﬂicts of interest. Yet lack of
accountability structures has meant that the failures of
Basel I and especially of Basel II had no impact on the
standing of the BCBS.
© 2013 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Global Policy (2013) 4:Suppl. 1
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Legitimacy and regulatory failure
Another big concern associated with TRNs is their (lack
of) legitimacy and the identiﬁcation of actions that could
be taken to remedy this defect. I adopt here Buchanan
and Keohane’s deﬁnition of legitimacy of global gover-
nance institutions. Under this deﬁnition, legitimacy has
both a normative and a sociological meaning:
To say that an institution is legitimate in the
normative sense is to assert that it has the right
to rule – where ruling includes promulgating
rules and attempting to secure compliance with
them by attaching costs to noncompliance and/
or beneﬁts to compliance. An institution is legiti-
mate in the sociological sense when it is widely
believed to have the right to rule (Buchanan
and Keohane, 2008, p. 25).
Essentially, the normative view of legitimacy asks
whether an international body was established by state
actors and/or organizations recognized under interna-
tional law. The latter must in turn have the requisite
competence under national and/or international law. The
‘sociological’ perception of legitimacy (‘believed to have
the right to rule’) is, arguably, the most pertinent to glo-
bal ﬁnance TRNs. Viewed from this angle, lack of political
controls (Underhill and Zhang, 2006; Wolfrum, 2008) in
the operation of global ﬁnance TRNs is no longer the
most important question. Heads of state and ministers
participate in the G20 and treasury departments are rep-
resented in several TRNs. It is more an issue of lack of
accountability mechanisms: soft law structures do not
allow for the establishment of lines of accountability sim-
ilar to those in place for the UN or the World Trade
Organization. Moreover, to meet the test imposed by the
‘sociological view’ of legitimacy, global governance insti-
tutions need to provide beneﬁts that cannot be provided
by states. However, soft law structures proved to be inef-
fective, or at best ‘marginally helpful’, in preventing and
managing the 2008 GFC (Zaring, 2010, pp. 477–485;
Giovanoli, 2009, pp. 83–85).
First, Basel capital adequacy standards were seriously
ﬂawed and are widely assumed to have contributed sig-
niﬁcantly to both the build-up and the severity of the
GFC. Second, the lack of formal structures for cross-bor-
der crisis management and the resolution of failing
banks generated gigantic amounts of confusion and
uncertainty. In turn, these developments led to a general-
ized collapse of conﬁdence in the markets, especially
after the messy collapse of Lehman Brothers.
The flawed capital adequacy regulations
It has been argued accurately and consistently that the
focus of Basel standards on individual institutions’ market
behaviour and ﬁnancial standing (microprudential regula-
tion) was ﬂawed (Brunnermeier et al., 2009, pp. 6–10).
Basel capital regulations also proved to be problematic
in many other areas, mostly because: (i) capital standards
were very procyclical; (ii) the capital standards tended to
foster regulatory arbitrage; (iii) the Basel I and Basel II
frameworks totally neglected liquidity risks in the bank-
ing sector, and (iv) the provision of incentives to adhere
to the risk modelling approach encouraged leverage,
allowing banks to assume large amounts of short-term
debt.
Basel capital requirements also showed a poor appreci-
ation of the importance and cost of strong equity cush-
ions. This was the result of both regulatory arbitrage,
whereby riskier assets attracting a higher capital cushion
were securitized and taken off balance sheets, and poor
capture of actual risks by the models used – especially
Basel II – which were based on industry-developed risk
management models. For instance, the so-called value at
risk (VaR) had serious shortcomings for a number of rea-
sons and probably constituted a ﬂawed way to capture
asset riskiness (Avgouleas, 2012, pp. 242–245).
Supervision of cross-border financial institutions
There has not been a clear distinction between the two
different functions of regulation – rule making and stan-
dard setting on the one hand and supervision on the
other – even in the domestic context (Pan, 2010; Lastra,
2003). Nevertheless, supervision is roughly deﬁned as the
day-to-day monitoring of regulated ﬁrms’ compliance
with applicable regulations and the imposition of sanc-
tions. The supervision of ﬁnancial markets has predomi-
nantly been conﬁned within national borders. TRNs have
no supervisory capacity of their own. However, the lack
of any capacity to supervise cross-border institutions and
of any clear crisis management (and burden sharing)
framework at the international level, which could recon-
cile home and host country interests, became a serious
problem during the GFC.
There are good reasons to believe that the Icelandic
authorities at least (and possibly Irish regulators as well)
were particularly permissive regulators, viewing their
banks as their national champions. Icelandic banks main-
tained a very widespread geographic distribution of
assets that was rather disproportionate to the size of the
country’s GDP. Host country authorities had no effective
tools for early intervention under the prevailing frame-
work. But early intervention was exactly what was
required in order not to place the host countries’ bank-
ing systems under serious threat (FSA, 2009, pp. 16, 56,
154).
Moreover, where national authorities faced colossal
cross-border bank rescue dilemmas and expensive
Global Policy (2013) 4:Suppl. 1 © 2013 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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conﬂicts of interest, memoranda of understanding and
other soft law structures played no meaningful role.
Characteristic examples are the acrimonious cross-border
treatment of the failure of Icelandic banks and the messy
rescue of Fortis, a large European bank with a strong
presence in three countries (BCBS, 2009, pp. 10–12). Both
cases are surprising examples as they happened within
or just outside the borders of the EU, the region with the
highest level of integration of banking markets and har-
monization of national banking laws.
Resolution of cross-border financial institutions
Arguably the most important lesson learned from the
collapse of Lehman Brothers is that, while the business
of international banking groups is run on an integrated
global basis, their corporate structures are highly frag-
mented and labyrinthic. Corporate complexity is normally
the result of regulatory and tax arbitrage or of local legal
requirements, or is employed in order to evade legal lia-
bility spilling over from one corporate entity to the other
within the same group (Herring and Carmassi, 2010;
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), 2009,
pp. 14–16). The Lehman and Fortis cases have high-
lighted the incompatibility of cross-border group struc-
tures with national resolution regimes and insolvency
procedures (Claessens et al., 2010). This is one of the big-
gest threats to ﬁnancial globalization: it has become
obvious that, in the absence of clear cross-border super-
visory structures and a single insolvency regime, the
operation of systemically important ﬁnancial institutions
on a cross-border basis entails serious dangers (CEPS,
2010).
The EU has moved towards the adoption of a harmo-
nized approach to bank resolution and insolvency (EU
Commission, 2012a) as the only realistic alternative to
the coordination chaos and risk of systemic collapse
observed during the Lehman failure and the Fortis res-
cue. On the other hand, the FSB has published a docu-
ment containing the key attributes that all bank
insolvency regimes ought to present and advocating a
mutual recognition approach to cross-border resolutions
(Financial Stability Board (FSB), 2011). However, the
mutual recognition approach that it champions essen-
tially means that most of the existing obstacles to cross-
border resolution remain.
Another very thorny issue is how to share the burden
in the case of rescuing a cross-border bank or other
ﬁnancial institution. Using taxpayers’ money in one coun-
try to bail out the institutions of another is an unjust
approach and is often politically untenable. Thus, in the
absence of an international convention (statute) govern-
ing the resolution of cross-border ﬁnancial institutions
and ﬁnancial groups, which would be backed by explicit
and legally binding burden-sharing arrangements, pro-
gress in this area should be regarded as limited, in spite
of the occasional hype.
All is not well with private-sector input
Some of the aforementioned failures should, in part, be
attributed to the quasi-regulatory role assigned to private
actors. The input of the latter is sometimes based on
rather imperfect science and is motivated by private
interests (Partnoy, 2006; Schwarcz, 2002); TRNs’ excessive
reliance on private actors’ knowledge and expertise is
often misplaced (Hellwig, 2010, p. 9). For example, the
strong push by industry to base capital adequacy stan-
dards on a risk modelling approach translated into
relentless equity reduction practices in favour of debt,
which of course led to overleveraged and severely under-
capitalized banks (BCBS, 2010; Hellwig, 2010, pp. 2–4).
Uncritical endorsement of private-sector expertise and
policy preferences also fostered self-regulation in deriva-
tives markets, which proved inadequate to prevent a
large-scale ﬁnancial crisis.
Uncritical endorsement of private-sector input in inter-
national ﬁnance regulation is based on the unfounded
assumption that private actors’ knowledge is complete.
In fact, it is very fragmentary and often unheeding of
true market conditions (Black, 2010, p. 6). Private-sector
input is subject to two limitations that are inherent to
such input beyond the obvious credibility gap relating to
private actors’ legitimate desire to promote their own
agenda. First, private actors, who are deeply entrenched
in the constantly changing currents of the markets, do
not have enough incentives to gather diverse pieces of
costly data that would provide a more complete picture
of the markets, when such data covers areas beyond
their immediate business needs. Second, market condi-
tions often differ from what is expected in equilibrium.
However, disequilibrium conditions are as much the
product of market actors’ own behaviour as of anything
else.
Private actors’ inadvertent myopia in disequilibrium is
witnessed beyond reasonable doubt by their frequent
inability to either identify an asset bubble or react prop-
erly to it. For instance, private actors’ cognitive biases
and sociopsychological pressures distort valuations and
trigger strategic trade behaviour (herding), which in turn
intensiﬁes disequilibrium conditions (Hirschleifer, 2001;
Avgouleas, 2010). Furthermore, the actions of private
actors themselves create the market conditions under
scrutiny, a phenomenon known as reﬂexivity (Soros,
1994). In those cases, requesting private actors to accu-
rately observe the impact of their own actions and inten-
tions in relaying their analysis of market conditions
to their regulatory masters/partners is stretching
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perceptions of private actors’ cognitive ability beyond
the limits of credulity. Therefore, TRNs’ information
advantages due to wider private-sector participation may
not be overestimated, and the global regulatory commu-
nity should look at the establishment of more formal
structures when it comes to identifying risks and espe-
cially the risks arising from innovative ﬁnancial tech-
niques and instruments.
Summary
Soft law and TRNs are very important and useful compo-
nents of global governance, especially in areas where a
strong pooling of sovereignty would be regarded as
intolerable by states. They also have several shortcom-
ings, as explained earlier. In many ways this form of gov-
ernance for international ﬁnance proved largely
ineffective. On the other hand, criticism of soft law struc-
tures should not ignore the valuable beneﬁts that coop-
erative forms of governance bring in a number of other
spheres of transnational interaction, chieﬂy information
sharing.
2. A new governance framework for global
finance
Rationale
Arguably, current reforms provide limited comfort when
it comes to: the global supervision of systemic risk; the
cross-border supervision of big cross-border ﬁnancial
institutions; the identiﬁcation and management of
emerging risks due to unpredictable combinations or cor-
relations of forces unleashed by ﬁnancial innovation with
other market and real economy forces; and the resolu-
tion of cross-border ﬁnancial groups. Therefore, in the
absence of a new governance system for global ﬁnance
addressing these shortcomings, the effectiveness of
recent regulatory reforms will be greatly undermined.
Despite recent reforms, many gaps remain in the
supervision of large ﬁnancial institutions and groups
operating on a global basis. These fractures would almost
certainly lead to three insurmountable problems that
would make the operation of systemic cross-border
ﬁnancial institutions, so-called G-SIFIs, a continuous
source of moral hazard, notwithstanding the important
new regulations that are underway to limit it. First, while
the cross-border operation of ﬁnancial institutions can
give rise to cross-border contagion leading to a general-
ized ﬁnancial crisis, the incentives of the home supervisor
to prevent this outcome could be weak. As the collapse
of the Icelandic banks has shown, home-country supervi-
sors are certain to face weak incentives to intervene
promptly, when the main asset or deposit base of the
institution in trouble is in another jurisdiction. The recent
introduction of supervisory cooperation structures such
as the so-called supervisory colleges might make
exchanges of information smoother, facilitating supervi-
sion, but they are unlikely to prove an effective crisis
management and resolution mechanism. Because col-
leges do not have power of intervention, especially as it
relates to PCA and resolution, it is unlikely that home
supervisors will be forced to act when they stand to lose
reputation and money (from the deposit insurance fund
or the resolution fund, or due to a public bailout) in
order to protect or rescue depositors or other creditors
of the ﬁnancial institution concerned when these are
located in other jurisdictions.
Moreover, the need for a global ﬁnancial policy and
risk research and regulation body is even greater in light
of the marked and continuous criticism directed at credit
rating agencies (CRAs): CRAs are the key private proces-
sors and assessors of ﬁnancial risk knowledge in the glo-
bal marketplace. Apart from the multitude of other ﬂaws,
CRA ratings also seem to be unpardonably procyclical or
tend to de facto dictate international public policy. In the
context of the ongoing sovereign debt crisis, CRAs have
been accused plausibly of creating a string of self-fulﬁll-
ing prophecies with their aggressive downgrading of EU
sovereign borrowers (OECD, 2011).
Finally, US and EU reforms in the ﬁeld of systemic risk
monitoring and bank resolution (Avgouleas, 2012), as
well as requisite FSB resolution proposals (Financial Sta-
bility Board (FSB), 2011), constitute a signiﬁcant step for-
ward, especially with respect to the orderly resolution of
large ﬁnancial institutions to minimize moral hazard. Yet
two big problems remain. First, there is no international
body dealing effectively with the monitoring of the sha-
dow banking sector and of systemic risk building up at
the global level. Second, recent reforms have made lim-
ited progress with regard to the resolution of cross-
border ﬁnancial groups. The absence of a single legal
regime (statute) dealing with the resolution of cross-
border ﬁnancial groups on a unitary basis, instead of
holding separate proceedings for each group entity (with
different legal personality) in a variety of jurisdictions,
further exacerbates this problem.
General principles of governance
It is suggested that a new international treaty is the best
means to effectively reconﬁgure the present nexus of
relationships between national regulators and global
ﬁnancial institutions and markets. Arguably, the same
results could be achieved by national authorities con-
tracting over their powers to the proposed global gover-
nance bodies. Yet an international treaty would provide
a level of certainty that would be lacking in bilateral
Global Policy (2013) 4:Suppl. 1 © 2013 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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arrangements. In order to build strong accountability
lines, the same treaty would make the four organizations
accountable to a new treaty-established governing coun-
cil (see Figure 1). This arrangement would extend to the
existing international bodies involved in the proposed
system, whose statutes would have to be amended.
The global ﬁnancial governance council would comprise
the G20 members (ministers or heads of state), the EU (as
an organization separate from its members), the UN (as an
organization separate from its members), the World Bank
and the three most important national economies that are
not represented in the G20. The governing council would
be convened every six months or whenever important
matters have to be discussed. In addition, key NGOs
should sit on the board of the ﬁnancial policy authority
and even be given voting rights when debating issues
within the NGOs’ areas of expertise.
Within the proposed structure, the four authorities
would be of equal status and they would be mandated to
cooperate in full, especially when it comes to the
exchange of information, the initiation of joint regulatory
action or the processing and evaluation of data (see Fig-
ure 1). The important decisions of the suggested system
of global ﬁnancial governance would be decided jointly
by the heads of the four authorities. However, each
authority would have the decisive vote in its respective
governance ﬁeld: systemic risk supervision, micropruden-
tial supervision, regulation production and resolution.
Any critical disagreements would be referred to the chair-
man of the governing council or the council plenary, but
this right would cover only planning decisions and not
instances where speedy action would be required such as
the imposition of sanctions, the prevention of an activity
that threatens systemic stability or initiating resolution
proceedings. Naturally, more detailed rules would have to
be instilled in the process to allow the system to take
effective and responsible action without fear of abuse.
Thus, the system would eventually develop its own set of
global administrative law rules. These arrangements
would provide clarity in the relationship between the
different authorities of the proposed scheme.
Unsurprisingly, if all G20 economies and the rest of the
EU subscribe to the new governance scheme, following
the signing of an international agreement, it would be
impossible for the rest of the world not to join. Apart from
the quality and credibility mark lent to institutions super-
vised under the scheme, the new governance system
would provide a further advantage. I suggest that the
scheme would provide to institutions falling under its
remit full freedom of establishment in foreign jurisdictions
and freedom to offer services on a cross-border basis, sub-
ject to local rules of conduct. Namely, it is proposed to
give institutions governed by the scheme a ‘single pass-
port’ facility similar to that granted by EU member states
to any ﬁnancial institution licensed in the EU.
The scheme would only be able to provide this facility
if World Trade Organization signatories agreed to a mod-
iﬁcation to the General Agreement on Trade in Services,
rendering the ‘prudential regulation carve-out’ inapplica-
ble for ﬁnancial institutions governed by the proposed
governance scheme. This should not prove an insur-
mountable problem: with the implementation of the sug-
gested scheme, authorities would be taking important
steps to safeguard systemic stability.
The establishment of a set of commonly accepted
shared values is of cardinal importance for the effective-
ness and legitimacy of a multilayered governance struc-
ture (Cottier, 2009; Weber, 2010). Thus, the departure
point for holding the regulatory bodies of the new struc-
ture to account would be their compliance not only with
their charters but also with a set of general principles
that should govern their actions. Several attempts have
been made to ﬁrst identify those principles (Lastra and
Garricano, 2010; Weber, 2010) and then deﬁne them, and
with reference to the general principles governing the
operation of the leading international ﬁnance soft law
bodies such as IOSCO (IOSCO, 2010). In this context, I
view three principles as beyond dispute. These are the
need to:
1. safeguard the global public good of ﬁnancial stability;
2. protect the robustness of ﬁnancial infrastructure, and
3. safeguard the integrity of global markets and protect
the investors and consumers of ﬁnancial services from
abusive practices and products that may be unsuit-
able for their risk proﬁle.
I also suggest that a fourth principle is added, even
though it may be used only as a supplement to the prin-
ciple of ﬁnancial stability. All actors of the new system
should be cognizant of their impact on the ability of
open and competitive ﬁnancial markets to foster eco-
nomic growth when the objective of ﬁnancial stability is
not compromised.
The macroprudential supervisor
The ﬁrst pillar of the proposed governance system, the
global systemic risk (macroprudential) supervisor, would
monitor both macroeconomic developments and the
state of the global ﬁnancial system, seen as encompass-
ing national, regional and international ﬁnancial systems
and the shadow banking sector. This duty would be
assigned to a revamped IMF (Lastra and Garricano, 2010)
by means of an international treaty. Doing so makes
good sense, given the IMF’s monitoring role with respect
to national balance of payments and sovereign indebted-
ness. In fact, the entanglement of ﬁnancial-sector stability
and solvency with sovereign indebtedness and vice versa
means that only a revamped IMF could effectively dis-
charge the duties of a global macroprudential supervisor.
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In addition, the IMF should be given the tools to moni-
tor closely the shadow banking sector in order to close
the current supervisory discontinuity. A possible way to
do this would be to require all shadow banks and hedge
funds to register with the IMF and ﬁle regular reports
with it. The scheme should be properly calibrated in
terms of asset thresholds to capture all important sha-
dow banking vehicles. Thus, it should provide for de
minimis exemptions to avoid the registration of small
funds.
Finally, the IMF should be entitled to recommend to
national regulators or the proposed global micropruden-
tial supervisor the right course of action against an
emerging systemic threat. It should also be considered
whether, in the context of the same treaty, it would be
feasible to give the IMF the power to directly require
ﬁnancial institutions to act upon emerging systemic risks.
The global macroprudential supervisor would only inter-
vene when the emerging risk constitutes a threat to
more than one country and has the potential to create a
cross-border crisis, thereby minimizing interference with
domestic ﬁnancial systems.
The microprudential supervisor
Political objections and realities notwithstanding, the
only effective solution to the regulation of G-SIFIs is to
subject G-SIFIs with a strong cross-border asset or liabili-
ties base (50 per cent and higher over total assets) to
the direct supervision of a global microprudential author-
ity to minimize the scope for regulatory arbitrage. The
role of the microprudential supervisor could gradually
evolve into a fully ﬂedged global markets regulator,
which could eventually be asked to exercise oversight
over mega-exchanges and wholesale derivatives markets.
The microprudential supervisor could exercise direct
oversight over G-SIFIs, and its remit could gradually
extend to cover certain wholesale segments of the global
derivatives and securities markets (Langevoort, 2010),
resolving the problem of regulation of mega-exchanges.
Thus, it is suggested that this role should be assigned to
a reconstituted and expanded FSB, where all G20
banking and capital markets regulators are already repre-
sented. The Bank of International Settlements (BIS), minus
its research division, would have to merge with the FSB.
Accordingly, the new microprudential supervisor would
essentially operate from existing BIS premises in Basel,
ensuring its neutrality.
This pillar of the proposed governance system is likely
to be opposed ﬁercely. Strong national interest dictates
that each country that serves as the home jurisdiction of
a big bank or other important ﬁnancial institution wishes
to be the principal regulator of this institution. This is so
ﬁrst for reasons of national economic interest, including
job preservation and credit growth in the national mar-
kets, and second for reasons of prestige and inﬂuence
over global economic affairs. Yet the logic of the pro-
posal is too strong to be dismissed out of hand. It elimi-
nates the scope for regulatory forbearance and provides
a framework for the consistent application of the new
international regulations. At the same time, sharing of
sovereignty over the supervision of the ﬁnancial sector is
limited to the international operations of big cross-border
institutions.
Global financial policy and risk regulation authority
The third pillar of the proposed governance structure is a
global ﬁnancial policy body that would oversee the TRNs,
including the Basel committee, and IOSCO under
arrangements that should be more binding than those
underpinning the FSB, which currently performs this role.
The suggested arrangements would not obliterate the
importance of the Basel committee or of other TRNs, nor
their value as importers of private-sector knowledge and
interlocutors with the private sector. This approach
would make the proposed scheme a truly multilayered
and hierarchical governance structure.
Accordingly, the third pillar should comprise the Orga-
nisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) and the research functions of the Bank of Inter-
national Settlements. It should deal with the production
of new regulation and the examination of emerging risks,
especially by means of various ﬁnancial innovations. The
new body should be the directing mind of international
ﬁnancial regulation.
TRN standards would have to pass a public interest
test set by the ﬁnancial policy body, which would focus
primarily on ﬁnancial stability and the ways the draft
standard serves the other general principles of the pro-
posed governance system. Once endorsed, the standards
would become binding, automatically or through manda-
tory implementation legislation, to all jurisdictions that
have opted into the proposed scheme and signed the
treaty.
The rule-making committees of the International
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), the standard-
setting committee of the International Accounting Stan-
dards Board (IASB), and other important private-sector
rule-making bodies would also come under the umbrella
of the ﬁnancial policy regulator; their standards would
have to be endorsed by the regulator, provided that they
met a public interest and ﬁnancial stability test. This
reform would secure coherence in standard setting and
rule making in the ﬁeld of international ﬁnance, eliminat-
ing the scope for rule conﬂict or uncertainty. The same
body should play the role of global risk knowledge bank
and manager. For example, neither the risks nor the
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potential beneﬁts of ﬁnancial innovation in open global
markets can be managed properly in the absence of
painstaking research and the testing of innovative ﬁnan-
cial instruments and techniques in real (or stimulated )
market conditions. The proposed authority would have
the mandate and resources to engage in authoritative
research and disseminate its ﬁndings widely.
A global resolution authority
The fourth pillar of the proposed system of governance
should be a global resolution authority. The resolution
operations of this body should be supported either by
burden-sharing arrangements between member coun-
tries, probably using assets-to-GDP ratios as a basis for
contributions (Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 2009), or by a
global resolution fund ﬁnanced by levying a tax on G-SI-
FIs. The best way to calculate such a levy would be on
the basis of the assessment of institution riskiness using
a risk matrix developed jointly with the proposed ﬁnan-
cial policy authority and TRNs, such as the BCBS, that
would work under its umbrella. Calibrating a levy on
G-SIFIs in this manner could satisfy the objective of
ﬁnancing resolution and curb excessive risk taking.
The establishment of a global resolution authority
tasked exclusively with carrying out the resolution of G-
SIFIs would be expected to address issues of impartiality
and mistrust that all cross-border resolutions are bound
to face due to the multitude of conﬂicting interests
(creditor, shareholder, employee and national) involved
in the process.
Furthermore, the global resolution authority may only
operate effectively if participating countries and institu-
tions accept its competence to intervene through the
implementation of attendant modiﬁcations to their
domestic laws. These ought to allow the global resolu-
tion authority to operate a single resolution and insol-
vency law for G-SIFIs. Country members of the scheme
could create a special statute that would apply exclu-
sively (lex specialis) to the resolution of G-SIFIs (Avgou-
leas et al., 2013). Finally, all ﬁnancial institutions
supervised by the proposed scheme would have to
amend their statutes to incorporate the changes necessi-
tated by the single-resolution model in order to minimize
the threat of shareholder and creditor litigation.
3. Evolution or revolution?
The global ﬁnancial governance model I outline in this
article constitutes a global regulatory ‘big bang’, but it is
not a new Bretton Woods. It provides answers to several
of the pressing challenges linked to open global markets,
but it does not tackle all of them. It also uses, to a
certain extent, existing institutional infrastructure and
emerging lines of responsibility in the ﬁeld of global
ﬁnancial governance. Arguably, once the fragmented and
ﬂuid governance structures and areas of expertise deal-
ing with international ﬁnance are pieced together, they
provide a strong guide as to which is the right path for
reform. The governance model presented here has also
considered efforts to chart a global ﬁnancial governance
model originating from other academic works (UN
Experts Report , p. 87; Alexander et al., 2006). Yet it is
sharply different and more far-reaching than previous
proposals. This radical shift is premised on experience
and knowledge we now have about: (i) the workings of
global ﬁnance; (ii) the causes of the GFC and the con-
tours of the ﬁnancial revolution; and (iii) the other chal-
lenges modern markets/economies face, such as the
widespread moral hazard to which too-big-to-fail institu-
tions give rise and the development objective.
Essentially, the prosperity of global markets and the
strong management and regulation of the risk emanating
from them has reached a critical junction. Since the post-
war years, whether it was matters of monetary stability,
or of war and peace, or the promotion of international
trade and protection of the environment, or the recon-
struction and development effort, whenever a major
component of global welfare has been in grave danger,
rational states have pooled sovereignty through interna-
tional law structures. They have done so in order to
effectively manage the requisite crisis properly and allevi-
ate the conditions giving rise to the problem. It is now
the turn of global ﬁnance to acquire a formal interna-
tional governance infrastructure dealing with the chal-
lenges raised by the operation of open global markets.
The proposed governance plan has the distinct advan-
tage of requiring the pooling of sovereignty only when it
comes to large cross-border ﬁnancial institutions and
mostly with respect to their cross-border operations.
Thus, loss of sovereignty is kept to a reasonable
minimum.
Recent reforms in the eurozone intended to establish
a European banking union, under which the European
Central Bank will supervise the 6000 banks operating in
eurozone member states, are particularly instructive (EU
Commission, 2012b). They lend strength to the argument
that an international governance structure for global
markets is the only effective defence against a return to
ﬁnancial protectionism.
Conclusions
Since 2008, the entire project of economic globalization
has been in grave peril. Nonetheless, in terms of global
economic growth, this is the worst time possible to
return to a closed-markets system. World requirements
for credit and investment to ﬁnance development,
sustainability and increased food production projects are
on the rise (Rolwey, 2011). These additional funds may
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only come from free and open global ﬁnancial markets,
notwithstanding the need, in certain cases, for very
short-term capital controls in order to curb speculative
capital ﬂows.
The multitude of complex challenges that ﬁnancial
globalisation creates may not be resolved in the absence
of solid and effective supranational regulatory structures
dealing with them. Building binding international struc-
tures for the governance of global ﬁnance is a natural
consequence of the operation of open global markets
and essential protection against risks emanating from
them. The model of governance proposed in this article
has the potential to prove a much better guardian of the
global public good of systemic stability than national or
regional regulators and the existing transnational regula-
tory networks.
The existence of a set of commonly accepted values is
the foundation of any multilayered system of governance
and the material that holds it together, reinforcing its
legitimacy (Cottier, 2009, p. 657). Thus, the proposed
architecture is based on a set of shared values (in the
form of general principles and sub-principles of gover-
nance). These would secure its coherence. They are also
much more cognizant of an additional (to ﬁnancial stabil-
ity) global public good: sustainable growth.
The inclusion of the development objective in the new
governance structure, notwithstanding the supremacy of
the ﬁnancial stability objective, would signal a reorienta-
tion in the operating values of global ﬁnance. The new
governance model would signal to global ﬁnance opera-
tors and developing nations the possibilities that global
ﬁnance holds in resolving development problems. This,
in turn, is a very good way to create a community of
interests between the two and thus broaden the legiti-
macy of the proposed governance system.
Note
I am grateful to Professors Charles Goodhart, Lawrence Baxter and Ste-
ven Schwarcz for critical comments on earlier versions of this article.
1. The FSB has offered the ﬁrst authoritative and formal deﬁnition
of ‘shadow banking’. It has described it as ‘a system of credit
intermediation that involves entities and activities outside the
regular banking system, and raises i) systemic risk concerns, in
particular by maturity/liquidity transformation, leverage and
ﬂawed credit risk transfer, and/or ii) regulatory arbitrage con-
cerns’ (FSB 2011, p. 3).
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